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The importance of small firms for economic development has been recognised 
across the globe.  Most governments are aware that smaller enterprises face 
problems not experienced by their larger counterparts, and have taken steps to 
provide financial assistance.  This article compares the experiences of small firms in 
the United Kingdom and Malaysia, and assesses whether public and private sector 
financial initiatives in the two countries have reduced the existence of the “finance 
gap” thought to prevail in both countries.  The research programme conducted for 
this article suggests that, despite differences in the financial infrastructures, the 
cultural backgrounds and stages of economic development, small firms in the UK 
and Malaysia seem to adopt the same financing practices and face the same 
difficulties in raising funds.  The reasons for this phenomenon are explored and the 
implications for policy-makers are discussed. 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
It has been well documented and acknowledged that small firms form a large 
majority of the population of businesses in most developed and developing 
countries1.  The vast majority of UK firms, 99.2 percent of a total population of 3.7 
million, employ fewer than 50 people and 2.5 million are sole traders (DTI, 1999).  
Small firms in the UK presently account for 38 percent of turnover and employ 44.7 
percent of the private sector workforce.  There are no equivalent figures for the 
contribution of small firms in Malaysia; however, such enterprises do represent the 
largest category of firms (around 84%) in the manufacturing sector (Business Times 
1996). 
 
Several academic studies have suggested that smaller enterprises play a critical role 
in assisting economic growth, improving the health of the economy, reducing 
unemployment, and promoting flexibility and innovation (e.g., Wilson, 1995; Storey, 
1994).  These findings make the case for government assistance on the grounds of 
direct economic benefits and positive “externalities” (Chittenden and Wildgust 1999).  
However, Curran (1999) emphasises that most small firms aim for survival and 
independence, rather than growth, while Gray (1998, p. 57) asserts that: “attitudes 
towards growth and the processes of growth itself are very complex.”   
 
For most businesses, growth is a positive and often necessary move for survival.  
Yet there are a number of potential drawbacks and problems associated with 
expansion.  Growth usually requires capital and smaller firms often require larger 
amounts of finance, relative to their total value, than larger companies (Binks and 
Coyne 1983).  It has often been suggested that the most commonly encountered 
obstacle to growth is raising the funds to support expansion plans (e.g., Bolton 
Committee 1971; Bank of England 1999; Chee 1986, 1992; Abdul Hamid and Abdul 
Rashid 1996).   
 
The reasons why small firms experience problems in raising finance are based on 
market imperfections that stem from aysmmetries, particularly in the bank/small firm 
relationship.  There is risk asymmetry between borrowers and lenders, whereby 
banks are unable to raise interest rates high enough to compensate for the 
perceived risk of failure of small firms, and information asymmetry, because the 
costs associated with the initial (and ongoing) appraisal of small firm advances are 
very high.  One consequence of these asymmetries is “adverse selection”.  This 
phenomenon arises when lenders fail to adjust the interest rate for individual 
companies, but simply raise interest rates for the small firm sector as a whole.  
Asymmetries are also associated with the “moral hazard” problem, whereby owner-
managers (OMs) might be tempted to sanction expenditure on abnormal fringe 
benefits.  To counter such problems, banks will typically call for collateral. 
 
The financing practices (i.e., patterns and sources of external finance) and problems 
(i.e., existence of difficulties in raising finance) of growth-oriented small firms were 
examined in a research programme that gathered data from small firms in both the 
UK and Malaysia.  The study attempted to answer these questions: 
 
 Do the characteristics of small firms and their OMs differ between the UK and 
Malaysia? 
 Do the requirements for external finance differ between small firms in the UK 
and Malaysia? 
 Do the sources and patterns of finance used by small firms differ between the 
UK and Malaysia? 
 Do the difficulties experienced by small firms in raising external finance differ 
between the UK and Malaysia? 
 
The authors anticipated that financing practices and problems would diverge 
between the two countries because of differences in, for example: the level of 
economic development (Peterson and Shulman 1987); legal and/or fiscal precedents 
(Tamari 1980); or the financial infrastructure (Austin et al. 1993).  It would be 
surprising to encounter no significant financing differences between the UK and 
Malaysia, despite the contrasting social, political, cultural and economic factors 
prevailing in the two countries.   
 
THE FINANCING OF SMALL FIRMS IN THE UK AND MALAYSIA  
 
Before addressing the above research questions, it is necessary to set out key 
developments in the financing of small firms in the two countries. 
 
The United Kingdom 
 
The Bolton Committee (1971), the Wilson Committee (1979) and numerous 
subsequent studies (including University of Cambridge 1992; Bank of England 1999) 
have reported that many small firms in the UK experience difficulties in raising long-
term capital from external sources.  The existence of finance “gaps” has persisted, 
despite the emergence of various forms of finance, both private and public, to assist 
the formation and expansion of small firms.  The gaps are perceived to be especially 
prevalent for firms operating in the high-technology sphere. 
 
Before the publication of “Bolton” (1971), a number of institutions had been set up by 
the government to help small businesses, but the impact of official initiatives was 
minimal.  In the years since “Bolton”, it has often been difficult to identify a coherent 
policy towards small firms.  However, official policy has been largely based on the 
philosophy that “any intervention to promote small firms can be justified only if it is 
directed at the removal of, or compensation for, market imperfections” (Bannock and 
Albach 1991, p. 31).   
 
Government support has concentrated on improving the provision of training, advice 
and consultancy rather than on direct assistance to firms (Boocock 1994).  Where 
finance has been offered to small firms, government schemes  have been designed 
to complement developments in private sector financial markets.  Some initiatives 
that illustrate this point are given below. 
 
Enterprise Investment Scheme (EIS). This initiative is a tax-based scheme to 
encourage individuals to invest directly into small firms (i.e., to act as “business 
angels”).  The EIS succeeded the Business Expansion Scheme (BES).  Under the 
BES, any investor not closely connected with the company could obtain tax relief on 
long-term, equity investments in new ordinary shares of qualifying unquoted 
companies.  However, the BES failed to stimulate new venture creation in high-risk 
enterprises (Mason and Harrison 1994) and it was replaced by the EIS in 1994.   
 
Under the EIS, companies can raise up to £1 million in equity per tax year.  The 
scheme includes greater safeguards to prevent funds being channelled into tax-
avoidance vehicles.  For many investors, however, the EIS is seen as somewhat 
bureaucratic and rather restrictive, with fiscal benefits being outweighed by the risks 
involved. 
 
Small Firms Loan Guarantee Scheme (LGS).  This initiative has been in operation 
since 1981.  The LGS assists small firms to obtain debt finance.  The rationale 
behind the scheme is:  
  to facilitate the supply of finance to viable small firms where conventional 
loans are not available, possibly due to lack of security or track record, (and) 
to give lenders experience of lending to businesses which have a viable 
proposal but do not satisfy normal banking criteria (NERA 1990, p. 103). 
 
Banks and other financial institutions are encouraged to provide finance up to a 
maximum of £100,000 for start-ups (£250,000 for established firms where the risk is 
reduced).  To counter the risk, the government guarantees 70 percent of any loan 
approved for new businesses (85 percent for established firms).  The borrower pays 
interest on the loan plus a premium of 1.5 percent of the amount guaranteed.  The 
Scheme provides “quasi-equity” loans and it “has reduced financial market 
imperfections by generating additional bank lending to viable projects, and a number 
of assisted firms have contributed significant economic additionality” (Boocock 1994, 
p. 64).  Nonetheless, the finance available under the LGS has the effect of 
increasing a firm’s gearing and it is expensive for the borrower.  After a careful 
review of the LGS in 1999, £150m of the funds allocated to the Scheme by 
government were switched to a series of new venture capital funds to direct funds to 
high-technology-based firms.   
 
This move confirmed that the UK government seems to be adopting a more 
interventionist approach to the financing of small firms.  There are also moves 
towards a more competitive element in funding, a switch that has implications for the 
selection and targeting of growth-oriented firms.  The new venture funds will back 
firms on the grounds of commercial rather than social criteria, even though previous 
attempts by official bodies to “pick winners” have tended to end in failure (Buckland 
and Davies 1995). 
 
In the private sector, banks continue to be the most significant source of external 
finance for small firms in the UK (University of Cambridge 1992; Confederation of 
British Industry 1993; Bank of England 1999).  The bank/small firm relationship came 
under strain in the 1980s.  Overeager lenders confronted overeager borrowers and 
the consequences of the recession of the early 1990s were disastrous for all parties.  
Total borrowing by the small business sector has fallen steadily over recent years, 
from £48bn in 1991 to £36bn in 1998 (Boocock 1999).  Action by the banks has 
enabled smaller firms to build more robust financial structures.  Within the overall 
borrowing figures, the ratio of overdraft to term lending has fallen from 49:51 in 1992 
to 30:70 in 1998.   
 
There is also increasing evidence that small firms are making use of a wider range of 
funding options, including asset-based finance and venture capital (both institutional 
and via business angels).  Bankers often act in a co-ordinating role, putting together 
appropriate financial packages in situations where traditional overdraft/term loan 
finance would not match the risk profile of a project.  High-technology firms were 
cited above as a “problem area”.  Such firms typically incur heavy research and 
development costs then launch untested products in volatile markets.  Banks have 
set up specialist units to assess proposals from such firms, and give appropriate 
advice on how to supplement conventional bank finance with risk capital. 
 
Venture capital is provided by a range of financial institutions, including insurance 
companies, pension funds and banks.  The amount invested by venture funds in UK 
companies has increased more than fourfold over the past decade, reaching nearly 
£8bn in 1999.  Nonetheless, the contribution of the industry in overcoming barriers to 
growth in smaller firms has been described as “modest” (ACOST 1990).  Generally, 
venture capitalists are reluctant to make investments of under £250,000, because of 
the “asymmetries” described above.  Many of the larger investments have been in 
later-stage proposals or buy-outs.   
 
As a consequence of the large-company focus of the formal venture funds, small 
firms often turn to informal investors for external equity (Mason and Harrison 1994; 
Coveney and Moore 1998).   
 
Small firms that achieve a certain size require access to junior stock markets with 
less stringent listing requirements and lower issue costs.  The Unlisted Securities 
Market and the Third Market encouraged firms to “go public” but met with limited 
success.  Both markets are now closed.  The Stock Exchange replaced them with 
the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) in June 1995.  The creation of AIM enables 
small companies to raise new capital, and allows shareholders to trade their shares 
or simply to benefit from the enhanced reputation of being a publicly quoted 
company.   
 
Malaysia 
 
Before independence in 1957, the Malaysian economy was largely dependent upon 
the agricultural sector and the production of prime commodities such as tin and 
rubber.  There were few manufacturing concerns.  The contribution of smaller 
enterprises was not significant, and the majority of such firms were engaged in 
traditional sectors such as wood-carving, handicrafts and the production of batik 
garments.  The nation has since experienced strong economic growth, transforming 
itself from a primarily commodity-producing country to a significant manufacturing 
centre. 
 
In the late 1960s, the potential of the small firm sector was recognised in the First 
Malaysia Plan, 1MP (1966-1970).  However, 1MP pointed out the financial difficulties 
faced by small firms (Malaysia 1966), without offering any solutions.  Small firms 
were given increased support in the Second Malaysia Plan (1971-1975), although 
firms in rural areas were the main beneficiaries (Malaysia 1971).  During this period, 
the New Economic Policy (NEP) was promulgated.  The NEP’s goal was to achieve 
national unity through poverty eradication.  The redistribution of wealth through 
social engineering was its main emphasis.   
 
The Government hoped to create a vibrant Bumiputera2 business community and 30 
percent Bumiputera ownership of the corporate sector by 1990.  The promotion and 
development of smaller enterprises (especially Bumiputera-owned) was a key part of 
the strategy to achieve this goal.  The 2MP made loans valued at around 
RM800million3 available to small firms over its five-year duration.  The NEP’s target 
of 30 percent Bumiputera ownership was not achieved, but the underlying philosophy 
of the NEP was retained in its successor, the National Development Policy.   
 
Over the past decade, both 6MP (1991-95) and 7MP (1996-2000) have confirmed 
the availability of key support measures, notably fiscal incentives, and offered 
additional programmes to facilitate the expansion and modernisation of small- and 
medium-sized enterprises.  Some of these programmes are briefly described below. 
 
The Malaysian Government has established a number of funds, through the Central 
Bank, Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM).  Such funds offer reasonable cost finance to 
rehabilitate ailing business and promote investment in priority sectors (Bank Negara 
Malaysia, various). 
 
 The Enterprise Rehabilitation Fund (ERF) was set up to provide seed capital 
to Bumiputera entrepreneurs adversely affected by the economic recession of 
the mid-1980s.  The ERF has operated ever since.  It was instrumental in 
helping many firms through the recession of the late 1990s.   
 The New Entrepreneurs Fund (NEF) was launched in 1989 to encourage 
Bumiputeras to establish businesses in manufacturing, agriculture, tourism 
and export-oriented industries.  In line with most of the Funds described here, 
the NEF has been topped up on a number of occasions since it was first 
established.   
 The Bumiputera Industrial Fund (BIF), also created in 1993, aims to stimulate 
the growth of small- and medium-sized enterprises (with at least 70% 
Bumiputera management and equity control), improving the design and 
quality of products, upgrading technology, and marketing products effectively.   
 
All these long-established Funds offer finance at reasonable cost on generous 
repayment terms.  For example, the BIF provides a maximum loan of RM2.5 million 
at an interest rate of 5 percent per year over a maximum period of eight years.   
 
BNM acted decisively in the face of the economic difficulties of the late 1990s, with 
the launching of the Fund for Small and Medium Industries, and the Rehabilitation 
Fund for Small and Medium Industries.  The desire to intervene in the market for 
finance remains strong.  Apart from these BNM schemes channelled through 
commercial banks and financial institutions, other government agencies play an 
important role in promoting the growth of small firms. 
 
Perbadanan Usahawan Malaysia Berhad (PUNB) Venture Capital Fund.  The 
PUNB Venture Capital Fund1 was launched in 1991, aimed at facilitating the entry of 
Bumiputera entrepreneurs into strategic industries and commerce.  Entrepreneurs 
with viable projects are eligible to apply and are expected to contribute at least 20 
percent of the total cost of the project.  However, Boocock and Wahab (1997) found 
that PUNB beneficiaries were mainly furniture manufacturers, rather than the high-
risk ventures normally associated with venture funding.   
 
Majlis Amanah Rakyat (MARA) Loans.  In line with the government’s effort to 
create and develop a viable Bumiputera Commercial and Industrial Community 
(BCIC), as outlined in the National Development Policy, MARA is actively involved in 
the formulation and management of Bumiputera industrial and commercial 
companies.  Its loan division provides credit to small firms, for the purchase of fixed 
assets and for working capital needs.  
 
Credit Guarantee Corporation (CGC).  The CGC Malaysia Berhad was set up in 
1972 to assist SMEs to gain access to institutional credit at reasonable cost.  Its role 
is to bridge the gap that exists between SMEs and lenders through the provision of a 
guarantee system that is commercially viable over the long term.  The guarantee 
system is principally aimed at assisting SMEs that have no collateral (or lack 
adequate collateral) to obtain the required institutional financing at reasonable cost.  
However, the overall effectiveness of CGC in meeting the needs of SMEs appears to 
have been somewhat limited (Boocock and Mohd Shariff 1995). 
 
In summary, the Malaysian government has introduced a variety of agencies and 
schemes to promote the development of smaller enterprises.  To strengthen and 
streamline institutional support, the Government recently rationalised 30 agencies 
under 13 ministries into five lead agencies.  The Ministry of Finance will co-ordinate 
the finance facilities. 
 
In the private sector, the extension of credit facilities to small firms by the commercial 
banks and finance companies has shown an increasing trend in recent years.  The 
government had encouraged financial institutions to allocate a prescribed proportion 
of their loans to smaller enterprises, and the institutions were keen to comply.  
However, the upward trend in bank lending to small firms was halted in 1998.  (At the 
time of the empirical research for this article, the economic recession of 1998 had 
not yet taken hold.)  The level of non-performing loans rose sharply, and the 
government implemented steps to remove such loans from the banks’ portfolios.  
The Fund for Small and Medium Industries, and the Rehabilitation Fund for Small 
and Medium Industries were also established.  Over the longer-term, the government 
is seeking to rationalise the banking system into a small number of well-capitalised 
institutions.  
 
Besides the commercial banks and finance companies, a variety of government-
sponsored institutions extend credit facilities to small firms.  They include the 
industrial finance institutions (mainly Malaysian Industrial Development Finance, 
Bank Pembangunan Malaysia Berhad, Bank Industri and the Sabah Development 
Bank), and the Federal Land Development Authority and rural credit institutions 
(mainly Bank Pertanian and Bank Rakyat). 
 
Venture capital financing in Malaysia is still in its infancy.  BNM encouraged banks 
and merchant banks to get directly involved in this industry as far back as the early 
1980s, but official attempts to promote growth in the supply of venture funds have 
not been a success (Boocock 1995).  Statistics for venture capital in Malaysia tend to 
be distorted by the inclusion of official funds (such as the PUNB Fund described 
above).  On the demand side, impediments to growth include: a reluctance to dilute 
ownership, the relative ease of obtaining bank credit, and a general lack of 
awareness of the role of venture capitalists (Lin 1994; Bank Negara Malaysia, 1994, 
1995).   
To give small companies the opportunity to earn a public listing, the Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange (KLSE) established a Second Board in 1988.  After a decade, the 
number of companies quoted on the Second Board had reached 282, compared to 
454 on the Main Board.  The gap in the number of quoted companies on the two 
markets has closed substantially as smaller enterprises have become more aware of 
the equity market as an alternative source of funding.  In addition, “strong economic 
fundamentals and corporate earnings enabled both stock markets to reach record 
levels of fund mobilisation and market capitalisation” (Boocock 1995, pp. 374-375).   
 The authorities also recognised the need for capital in higher risk firms and an over-
the-counter market was planned for 1997.  However, logistical and economic 
problems meant that the launch of the Malaysian Exchange of Securities Dealing 
and Automated Quotation (MESDAQ) was delayed by more than 2 years.  MESDAQ 
aims to attract high growth firms, especially those involved in technology based 
activities.  The launching of MESDAQ gives venture funds an exit route for their 
investments, hence it could open up avenues for venture capital to play a more 
active role in financing the early stages of new and technology-based firms.  
Progress in attracting companies to the new market has been modest.  In terms of 
equity finance, therefore, the formal venture capital market has not really taken off, 
and the stuttering start by MESDAQ is unlikely to boost the availability of venture 
capital.  On a more positive note, Boocock and Wahab (1997) observed that 
business angels do play an important role in providing risk finance to many small- 
and medium-sized enterprises in Malaysia. 
 
 
Comparison between UK and Malaysia 
 
Both countries appear, on the face of it, to be well provided with institutional sources 
of finance for small firms.  Furthermore, the governments of both countries have 
introduced a range of policy initiatives, schemes and institutions to ensure that small 
firms have access to finance.  The UK government’s policy towards small firms 
remains largely based on the free market philosophy, with the aim of ensuring that 
competition between large and small firms is based on equality.  Recent moves have 
been towards an interventionist approach, despite the fact that small firms in the UK 
have access to a greater number and range of private sector funding opportunities.  
The Malaysian government adopts a more proactive approach, underpinned by 
national programmes to ensure more participation by Bumiputeras in business 
activities.  There is a critical difference in policy implementation.  In Malaysia, the 
provision of finance at concessionary rates is considered an essential element of 
helping small firms, whereas the provision of soft loans in the UK is regarded as an 
unwarranted intrusion within the free-market economy. 
 Despite the rapid expansion in the range of public and private sector financial 
initiatives, there is widespread perception that “finance” or “equity” gaps continue to 
exist in both countries (Boocock and Wahab 1997; University of Cambridge 1992).  
These gaps are perceived to present a major constraint to small firm growth in both 
countries (Chee 1986; ACOST 1990; Murray 1999), although the extent of any gaps 
is open to debate (DTI/Aston Business School 1991; Buckland and Davis 1995).   
 
The findings of this article should add to this ongoing debate. 
 
THE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
 
This study was concerned with the financing of small manufacturing firms in both 
countries.  The empirical research comprised a questionnaire survey administered in 
the UK and Malaysia, supplemented by in-depth interviews with a selection of firms 
in both countries.  The interviews were used to generate valuable case studies.  The 
criteria for inclusion in both parts of the research programme were that a firm had to 
be independently owned and employ fewer than 50 people.   
 
The same questionnaire format was used in the UK and Malaysia.  In the UK, a 
sample of small firms in the East Midlands region was selected at random from a 
commercial list supplied by Dun and Bradstreet (a major private-sector information 
source).  The Malaysian sample was derived from lists obtained from the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry and the Malaysian Entrepreneurship Development 
Centre.   
 
As suggested by Sudman and Bradburn (1982), a booklet format questionnaire was 
used in order to achieve a good response.  To determine the potential effectiveness 
of the research instrument, and to ensure that it met the objectives of the study, a 
pretest and pilot study of the questionnaire was conducted in both countries.  A 
number of changes were incorporated to enhance return rates.  A total of 1,000 and 
520 questionnaires, respectively were sent in the UK and Malaysian surveys.  One 
week after the initial posting, follow-up postcards were sent to nonrespondents.  A 
total of 228 questionnaires (22.8%) were returned and usable for analysis for the 
U.K. study and 112 (22.0%) for the Malaysian study.  These response rates compare 
favourably with similar studies conducted in this field (Boocock and Mohd Shariff 
1996). 
 
The questionnaire data facilitated quantitative analysis, but the case studies provide 
a rich source of qualitative data.  Eight firms were interviewed in each country.  In the 
context of this article, crucial information was gathered on growth orientation and the 
funding of past investment and future plans.   
 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
This section uses the questionnaire data to compare the experience of small firms in 
the two countries, focusing on the small firm and OM characteristics, sources and 
patterns of finance, and difficulties in financing growth.  The analysis concentrates on 
the questionnaire findings, but includes the qualitative data to illustrate key points. 
 
Characteristics of Small Firms and OMs 
 
A summary of the characteristics of small firms is shown in Exhibits 1 and 2.   
 
Over half of the sample firms in the UK (64.1%) and Malaysia (58.0%) employ fewer 
than 20 employees and the largest category in both countries (36.0% in the UK and 
37.5% in Malaysia) employ fewer than 10 staff.  The size profiles in the two countries 
are broadly similar, although firms in Malaysia do employ more in the three “above 
20” size bands - probably because wage costs are generally lower in Malaysia.  
 
In terms of age, the highest frequency category in the UK (28.9%) comprises firms 
that had been in operation for more than 20 years; by contrast, 28.7 percent of 
Malaysian firms had been in existence for between 5 and 9 years.  More than half of 
the sample firms in Malaysia (55.6%) are less than 10 years old, while such firms 
account for only 34.0 percent of the UK sample.  Small manufacturing firms in 
Malaysia are clearly younger than their counterparts in the UK.  This finding is not 
surprising because small firms have been a feature of the UK industrial and 
commercial landscape for much longer than in Malaysia. 
 In both countries, small manufacturing firms make use of external advisers.  
However, Malaysian firms generally rely on relatives and friends (42.9%) whereas 
the UK firms tend to turn to accountants (71.1%) for financial advice.  Accountants in 
Malaysia are generally linked with large firms and the preparation of financial 
statements for tax purposes.  Banks are used regularly for advice by small firms in 
both countries.  Chambers of commerce are consulted frequently in Malaysia 
(17.0%), but they are rarely used in the UK. 
 
Nearly 75 percent respondent firms in both countries are private limited companies.  
This legal form assists in fund raising, especially the ability to create collateral on 
company property. 
 
Almost 40 percent of UK respondent firms are involved in fabricated metal products 
or textiles - great strengths of the East Midlands region.  The three largest categories 
in Malaysia are wood and wood products, rubber and plastics, and food.  The focus 
on natural resources is to be expected, and Malaysians love their food, much of 
which is provided by small firms.  The majority of respondent firms in the UK (62.7%) 
and Malaysia (71.4%) could not, using a broad brush definition, be classed as 
“technology-based”. 
Exhibit 1: Respondent Firm Characteristics 
(Comparative Analysis) 
Characteristics United Kingdom 
(Percent) 
(N = 228)
Malaysia
(Percent)
(N = 112)
Employment Category  
     1-9 employees   36.0   37.5
     10-19 employees   28.1   20.5
     20-29 employees   11.4   12.5
     30-39 employees   10.5   11.6
     40-49 employees   14.0   17.9
Total 100.0 100.0
 
Age of Firm 
     4 years & below   12.7   26.9
     5-9 years   21.3   28.7
     10-14 years   23.5   24.1
     15-19 years   13.6     8.3
     20 years and above   28.9   12.0
Total 100.0 100.0
 
Use of External Financial Adviser 
     Did not use external adviser   22.8   26.8
     Used external adviser   77.2   73.2
Total 100.0 100.0
 
Sources of Advice 
     Accountants   71.1   25.9
     Bankers   41.4   40.2
     Relatives/Friends   11.5   42.9
     Local Authority     4.8     9.8
     Chamber of Commerce     0.4   17.0
 
Sector of Industry (i) 
     Fabricated Metal Product   21.1   15.2
     Textiles   18.9     2.7
     Publishing & Printing     8.8     2.7
     Rubber & Plastic      Products     6.6   11.6
     Wood & Wood Products     6.6   25.0
     Paper & Paper Products     4.4     2.7
     Electrical Machinery     4.4     1.8
     Chemical & Chemical Products     3.5     2.7
     Basic Metals     2.6     5.4
     Food Products & Beverages     1.7   12.5
     Motor Vehicle & Parts     1.7     3.6
     Other Manufacturing Industry   19.7   14.1
Total 100.0 100.0
 
(ii) Non Technology-based   67.5   71.4
     Technology-based   32.5   28.6
Total 100.0 100.0
 
Business Plan 
     Did not have a written business plan   67.5   48.2
     Had a written business plan   32.5   51.8
Total 100.0 100.0
 Exhibit 2: Respondent Owner-Manager Characteristics 
(Comparative Analysis) 
 
Characteristics United Kingdom
(Percent)
(N = 228)
Malaysia
(Percent)
(N = 112)
 
Age Group 
     20-29 years     1.8   15.2
     30-39 years   16.7   33.9
     40-49 years   38.1   28.6
     50-59 years   29.4   20.5
     60 years & above   14.0     1.8
Total 100.0 100.0
 
Training and Business Management 
     No training   59.2   21.4
     Some training   40.8   78.6
Total 100.0 100.0
 
Level of Education 
     Primary (and Secondary) Education   35.5   16.1
     Post-Secondary Education   28.5   49.1
     Degree or equivalent   36.0   34.8
Total 100.0 100.0
 
Level of Experience 
     No working experience     9.2   21.4
     4 years & below   23.2   31.3
     5-9 years   26.8   26.8
     10-14 years   18.0   13.4
     15-19 years     9.2     5.4
     20 years & above   13.6     1.8
Total 100.0 100.0
Slightly more than half of firms in Malaysia (51.8%) claim to have prepared 
business plans, whereas only 32.5 percent of respondents in the UK have 
produced such documents.  The importance of business plans to support 
expansion has been widely acknowledged (Hannon and Atherton 1998).  The OMs 
of sample firms in the UK, therefore, have still be convinced that it is worth giving 
up their valuable time for the preparation of plans.  The lack of planning might also 
suggest that the firms have limited growth ambitions.  The position in Malaysia 
appears to be more positive – assistance from government agencies in Malaysia is 
often linked to the production of a business plan.  However, it is not clear how the 
plans are used. 
 
Exhibit 2 reveals that the most frequent age category of the OMs in Malaysia is the 
30-39 bracket (33.9%), and almost half of OMs (49.1%) are below 40 years old.  In 
the UK, the age profile is significantly older, with the 40-49 years category 
accounting for 38.1 percent of the sample.  
 
Marginally more OMs hold a degree or equivalent in the UK compared to Malaysia 
(36.0% and 34.8%, respectively).  However, it is evident from Exhibit 2 that OMs in 
Malaysia tend to have been educated for longer at secondary/high school level.  
Many OMs in the UK left school as soon as possible.  The comparison between 
the two countries with regard to business/management training is even more 
striking.  Most Malaysian OMs (78.6%) have undergone some form of training, 
whereas a majority of UK OMs (59.2%) have chosen not to pursue such training. 
 
Why should this differential in training be so strong?  There is an ongoing debate 
in the UK about the value of business training (Westhead and Storey 1997; Cosh 
et al. 1998).  The poor training opportunities could stem from a lack of awareness 
by OMs or “reservations about the ability of training to provide solutions to OMs’ 
problems” (Mahmood 1993, p. 71).  The OMs in Malaysia seem to accept the need 
for training more readily.  The explanation for this phenomenon might lie in a less-
questioning culture in Malaysia (training is accepted as a ‘good thing’) or because 
training is often linked to the provision of official funding sources. 
 
Exhibit 2 also shows that Malaysian OMs are much less experienced than their UK 
counterparts.  The majority of OMs in the UK (67.6%) have more than 5 years 
work experience, with the equivalent figure for Malaysia being 47.4 percent.  One 
would anticipate this finding, given the age profile of the OMs and firms in the 
respective national samples.   
 
Overall, therefore, OMs in the UK are generally less well educated (both at school 
and for business training), and they spend less time on the production of business 
plans.  However, they (and their firms) are generally older and, as a consequence, 
OMs in the UK have greater business experience. 
 
Need for External Finance 
 
Exhibit 3 confirms that the majority of small manufacturing firms in the UK (61.0%) 
and Malaysia (78.6%) approach external sources of finance to support business 
growth.  To assess whether the need for external finance in both countries is 
significantly different, the chi-square test of independence was performed at the 5 
percent significance level.  The chi-square value of 10.49 implies there is a greater 
need for external finance in Malaysia. 
 
Exhibit 3: Need for External Finance 
(Comparative Analysis) 
 
External Finance United 
Kingdom 
Malaysia 
   
Did Not Approach External Finance   89      (39.0%)   24     (21.4%)
Approached External Finance 139      (61.0%)   88     (78.6%)
 
Total 228      (61.0%) 112      (100%)
 
                                             χ2   10.49   
                                            df 1, p 0.001   
 
The most frequently cited reason for applying for external finance in Exhibit 4 
(overleaf) is to increase sales and/or share within existing markets (UK, 71.2%; 
Malaysia, 69.2%).  This demand for finance could be for short-term, working 
capital needs, or to satisfy longer-term requirements for investment in (say) 
enhanced production facilities.  The need for Malaysian firms to sell existing 
products in new markets (whether at home or overseas) is evident.  This is not 
surprising, given the limited domestic market facing Malaysian small firms.   
 
Exhibit 4: Reasons for Applying for External Finance 
(Comparative Analysis) 
 
 
Reasons 
UK  
(Percent) 
(N = 139) 
Malaysia
(Percent)
(N = 88)
  
To increase sales/share of existing market 71.2 69.3
To introduce new products to existing markets 16.5 13.6
To enter new markets with existing products 15.8 60.2
To expand overseas   7.9 22.7
To acquire another firm   5.8   4.5
 
In line with expectations, only a small number of firms in the U.K. and Malaysia 
(5.8% and 4.5%, respectively) sought external finance for acquisition purposes. 
 
The need for external finance was explored in the 16 case studies.  The literature 
suggests that growth-orientation of the firm will be strongly associated with the 
need for additional funding.  The case study firms were divided into three 
categories of growth - fast, steady and “none” – in terms of past performance and 
future growth intentions (see Exhibit 5).  Growth was considered in a number of 
dimensions, including sales and profits, but principally whether the firms had 
conducted (or intended to conduct) product/process innovation or undertaken (or 
planned to undertake) investment.  The case studies confirm that growth-oriented 
firms do require additional finance.  However, the evidence as to whether case 
study firms in Malaysia have a greater need for external finance was inconclusive. 
 
Sources of External Finance 
 
Exhibit 6 demonstrates that small manufacturing firms in either Malaysia or the UK 
make little use of external equity finance.  The vast majority of small firms prefer to 
use internal equity, particularly personal savings (Md. Salleh 1990; Levy, 1993) 
and retained profits (Oakey et al. 1991).  Where external equity is sought, small 
firms in both countries generally turn to relatives and friends as a first resort, 13.0 
percent and 13.6 percent in the UK and Malaysia, respectively.  Business angels 
in both countries tend to be associated with investee firms beforehand, although 
investors in some UK firms had utilised the BES Scheme or EIS (7.9%).   
 
A greater number of firms in the UK (12.2%) use formal venture capital, compared 
to a mere two firms in Malaysia (2.3%).  Firms in Malaysia (8.0%) also take 
advantage of the government-backed PUNB scheme (it was suggested above that 
this could not be classed as genuine venture funding).  The low utilisation of 
venture funding in Malaysia is not unexpected, given the state of development of 
the sector, and the reasons outlined above (e.g., the reluctance to dilute 
ownership for fear of losing control). 
 
Turning to debt finance, Exhibit 6 confirms the overall importance of banks as the 
principal providers of external debt.  Small firms in both countries rely heavily on 
short- and medium-term debt finance.  Nevertheless, overdraft finance remains the 
most widely used source by firms in Malaysia (58%) and in the UK (79.1%).  This 
pattern confirms previous studies (including Stanworth and Gray 1991; Austin et 
al. 1993).  While overdraft finance can offer flexibility at lower cost, it can also be 
associated with poor business planning and a lack of financial control 
(Confederation of British Industry, 1993).  Some firms in both countries appear to 
have used overdraft finance to fund the purchase of fixed assets or other long-
term requirements.   
 
More firms in Malaysia have taken out short-term loans (39.8% compared to 
32.4% in the UK).  More UK firms have access to longer-term loans; this confirms 
the recent trend towards longer-term funding in the UK (Bank of England 1999), 
but the trend is certainly not pronounced in the data in Exhibit 6.  If the study were 
to be repeated in the year 2000, the proportion of loans in the “over 5-year” 
category would probably be much higher. 
Exhibit 5: Summary of Case Studies 
 
United Kingdom 
Firm Products 
Manufactured 
Past 
Growth 
Growth 
Potential 
Sources of 
Internal Finance 
Sources of External Finance Financing 
Difficulties 
Equity Debt 
A Textiles Steady Steady Retained profits 
Personal savings 
None Bank overdraft 
Bank term loan 
Hire purchase 
Leasing 
No difficulty 
B Leather Steady Steady Retained profits None Bank overdraft 
Bank term loan 
No difficulty 
C Medical 
Equipment 
Rapid Steady Retained profits 
Director’s loan 
None Bank overdraft 
Hire purchase 
Unreasonable 
security/ 
collateral 
D Textiles Rapid No 
growth 
Retained profits None Bank overdraft 
Bank term loan 
Hire purchase 
No difficulty 
E Publishing Steady Steady Retained profits None Leasing Insufficient 
finance 
available 
F Machine 
Tools 
Rapid Rapid Retained profits None Bank overdraft 
Bank term loan 
Government-
backed (LGS) 
British Coal 
Hire purchase 
Unreasonable 
security/ 
collateral 
G Rubber Rapid Rapid Retained profits Government-
backed 
(BES) 
Relatives 
Bank overdraft 
Bank term loan 
Hire purchase 
Leasing 
 
Lack of 
collateral, 
high interest 
rate & 
insufficient 
finance 
available 
H Industrial 
Design 
Steady No 
growth 
Retained profits 
Personal savings 
Director’s loan 
None Bank overdraft 
Trade Credit 
Hire purchase 
 
No difficulty 
 
 
Exhibit 5: Summary of Case Studies (continued) 
 
Malaysia 
Firm Products 
Manufactured 
Past 
Growth 
Growth 
Potential 
Sources of 
Internal Finance 
Sources of External Finance  Financing 
Difficulties 
Equity Debt 
I Chemicals Rapid Rapid Director’s loan None Bank overdraft 
Bank term loan 
Hire purchase 
Insufficient 
finance 
available & 
high interest 
rate 
J Wire Rapid Rapid Retained profits None Relatives 
Government-
backed (ITAF) 
Bank term loan 
Leasing 
Insufficient 
finance 
available 
K Fabricated 
Steel 
Steady Steady Retained profits 
Personal savings 
 
Relatives Trade credit 
Hire purchase 
Insufficient 
finance 
available 
L Leather Steady Steady Retained profits 
Personal savings 
 
None Bank overdraft 
Bank term loan 
Government-
backed (ERF) 
No difficulty 
M Electronic 
Components 
Rapid No 
growth 
Retained profits 
Personal savings 
None Bank term loan 
Hire purchase 
No difficulty 
N Staples/ 
Paper clips 
Steady Rapid Retained profits None Bank overdraft 
Bank term loan 
Hire purchase 
Leasing 
High interest 
rate & lack of 
collateral 
O Plastics Rapid Rapid Retained profits Government-
backed 
(PUNB) 
 
Bank overdraft 
Bank term loan 
Hire purchase 
Trade credit 
Government-
backed (CGC 
& ITAF) 
No difficulty 
P Plastics Steady No 
growth 
Retained profits 
Personal savings 
None Bank overdraft 
Bank term loan 
Hire purchase 
Trade credit 
No difficulty 
 
Besides bank finance, other non-bank sources are also used, especially hire-
purchase and trade credit in Malaysia and leasing in the UK.  Government-backed 
loan schemes are more widely used in Malaysia, although utilisation is relatively 
modest in both countries.   
 
The case studies amplify key aspects of the questionnaire findings.  In the UK and 
Malaysia, firms with rapid growth performance or potential were more likely to 
make use of government-backed schemes.  With regard to external equity funding, 
this finding has to be tempered with caution.  No firms had used formal venture 
capital, and only one firm in each country had utilised the BES (UK) and PUNB 
(Malaysia) - both of these schemes allow the recipient to retain more equity than 
private sector risk capital.  Fast-growth firms also have greater utilization of bank 
overdrafts and term loans, as well as hire purchase and leasing.  Irrespective of 
the growth orientation of the case study firms, the financial structures were 
generally consistent with the “pecking order hypothesis” - internal debt and equity 
is preferred to external debt, with external equity considered as a last resort (Cosh 
and Hughes 1994; Myers and Majluf 1984). 
 
Overall, the questionnaire and case study data suggest the sources of finance 
used by small firms in the two countries are broadly similar.  
 
Financing Patterns 
 
Although it was not possible to ascertain the precise composition of external equity 
and debt within financing packages - the information was too sensitive to explore 
in the questionnaire or even in the interviews for the case studies – Exhibit 7 
summarizes the questionnaire responses. 
 
The majority of questionnaire respondents in Malaysia (76.1%) and the UK 
(69.8%) do not use external equity.  Where external equity is used, firms in both 
countries tend to rely on a single source.  Only 2.3 percent and 4.3 percent, 
respectively, of sample firms in Malaysia and the UK utilize more than one source 
of external equity.  The pattern of debt finance is quite different, with multiple 
sources of debt being much more prominent.  Only a small percentage of 
Malaysian and UK firms (2.3% and 0.7%, respectively) do not have some form of 
debt finance.   
 
To assess whether the pattern of external finance used by respondent firms in the 
two countries is significantly different, the chi-square test was again executed.  
(The  “one source” and “two source” categories of equity finance were combined to 
avoid the problem of small expected frequencies: Siegel and Castellan 1988).  The 
chi-square values shown in Exhibit 7, 1.08 for equity and 8.70 for debt, are not 
significant at the 5 percent level.   
 
It is difficult to draw any definite conclusions, given the lack of data on the 
proportion of debt/equity financing used to fund expansion.  However, the findings 
do not point to any significant differences in the pattern of external finance by 
small firms used in Malaysia and the UK. 
 
Difficulties in Raising External Finance 
 
Whilst the majority of small manufacturing firms in Malaysia (80.7%) and in the UK 
(84.9%) had succeeded in a recent application for external finance (Exhibit 8), a 
greater percentage of Malaysian than UK firms (49.3% compared to 44.1%) had 
encountered some difficulties (Exhibit 9).  The chi-square values shown in Exhibits 
8 and 9 are not significant, implying that the incidence of financing difficulties is 
independent of the two countries.  
 
Exhibit 10 offers more meaningful data.  The main financing difficulties, as 
anticipated, relate to the availability of sufficient finance (usually linked to a lack of 
collateral) and high interest rates (Chee 1986; Binks et al. 1986; and Stanworth 
and Gray 1991).  These factors combine to create “financing difficulties” – an 
outright failure to obtain the required funding, or perhaps being offered insufficient 
finance at higher than anticipated interest rates.  The duration of loans was also 
one of the major obstacles facing Malaysian firms. 
 
Exhibit 6: Sources of External Finance 
(Comparative Analysis) 
 
 
Sources 
United Kingdom
(Percent)
(N = 139)
Malaysia
(Percent)
(N = 88)
Equity 
Venture Capital 12.2   2.3
Government-backed Scheme   7.9   8.0
Relatives/Friends 13.0 13.6
 
Debt 
Bank Overdraft 79.1 58.0
Bank Loan (<5 years) 32.4 39.8
Bank Loan (>5 years) 18.7 15.9
Trade Credit 26.6 43.2
Government-backed Scheme   6.5 14.8
Hire-Purchase 46.0 51.1
Leasing 29.0 19.3
Factoring   7.9   2.3
 
Exhibit 7: Patterns of External Finance 
(Comparative Analysis) 
 
Sources United Kingdom Malaysia
Equity 
None   97        (69.8%) 67         (76.1%)
One Source   36        (25.9%) 19         (21.6%)
Two Sources     6          (4.3%)   2           (2.3%)
Total 139      (100.0%) 88       (100.0%)
                                              χ2  1.35   
   
Debt   
None 1          (0.7%) 2          (2.3%)
One Source 32        (23.0%) 25        (28.4%)
Two Sources 40        (28.8%) 27        (30.7%)
Three Sources 39        (28.1%) 11        (12.5%)
Four or More Sources 27        (19.4%) 23        (26.1%)
Total 139      (100.0%) 88      (100.0%)
                                              χ2  8.70   
   
                                       df 2, p 0.509 Equity  
                                       df 4, p 0.070 Debt  
  
Exhibit 8: Status of Recent Application for External Finance 
(Comparative Analysis) 
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 9: Existence of Difficulties in Obtaining External Finance 
(Comparative Analysis) 
 
 
Status United Kingdom Malaysia
Not Successful     21      (15.1%)   17      (19.3%)
Successful   118      (84.9%)   71      (80.7%)
Total   139    (100.0%)   88    (100.0%)
                                             χ2  0.69   
                                     df 1, p 0.408  
Existence of Difficulties United Kingdom Malaysia
No Difficulty 66    (55.9%) 36   (50.7%)
Some Difficulties   52    (44.1%) 35   (49.3%)
 Total 118  (100.0%) 71 (100.0%)
  χ2  0.49    
                                        df 1, p 0.485  
 Exhibit 10: Types of Difficulties in Obtaining External Finance 
(Comparative Analysis) 
 
 
 
The case studies confirm that growth-oriented firms tend to suffer more difficulties in 
raising finance than (say) lifestyle businesses.  This phenomenon applies in both 
countries.  The analysis should not suggest, however, that all reasonable funding 
propositions were refused.  The researchers only heard the entrepreneurs’ side of 
the story.  Small firms will always seek more finance at a lower cost and with fewer 
strings attached.  Innovation is risky, especially where younger firms are involved.  
Fast growth firms frequently seek to develop new products for which demand is 
uncertain.  Bankers and other financiers have to make decisions on commercial 
viability.  Furthermore, the presentation of proposals may have been weak.   
 
Overall, however, this research programme could not isolate significant differences in 
the financing difficulties between the two countries. 
 
Types of Difficulties United Kingdom 
(Mean) 
(N = 52) 
Malaysia 
(Mean) 
(N = 35) 
Insufficient amount of finance 4.14 3.75 
Unreasonable level of collateral 3.98 3.26 
High interest rate 3.87 3.29 
Duration of loan offered was too short 2.65 3.37 
   
The mean scores for the variables rest on a five-point Likert-type scale, 
with “1” denoting strongly disagree and “5” strongly agree on the variables. 
DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This article compared the experiences of small manufacturing firms in the UK and 
Malaysia, focusing on small firm and OM characteristics, sources and patterns of 
finance, and difficulties in financing growth.  The questionnaire data revealed no 
significant differences between small firms in the two countries with regard to legal 
status, type of industry and size of the firms.  There are, however, some marked 
differences relating to age of firms and OMs; use of external advisers; existence of 
business plans; and level of education, training and experience of OMs.  These 
factors exert some influence on the need for external finance between the two 
countries, but wider economic, social and cultural factors appear to have a stronger 
effect on the sources/patterns of finance and the difficulties experienced in fund 
raising. 
 
There is a significant difference between the two countries with regard to the need for 
external finance by small manufacturing firms.  This striking difference can perhaps 
be explained by the different stages of economic development between the UK and 
Malaysia.  The later industrialisation of Malaysia means that sample firms are 
generally newer, with a smaller base of retained profits to use as a springboard for 
fund raising.  The continuing dependence of the economy on commodities such as 
wood and rubber means that firms might be trying to move into other areas, requiring 
finance to support investment plans.   
 
The difference in the need for external finance could also stem from the differing 
levels of sophistication in the financial infrastructures in the UK and Malaysia.  The 
UK has a well-developed financial spectrum, largely deregulated and making use of 
advanced credit appraisal techniques.  It is generally acknowledged that equity and 
finance gaps have narrowed over the years, although there will always be firms at the 
margin of the risk/return frontier that feel they are denied legitimate access to 
requests for funds.  However, there is little reason to suppose that a liberalized 
financial market will not offer competitive products, rates and terms to firms that wish 
to avail themselves of support (Buckland and Davis 1995, p.277). 
 
The banking industry in Malaysia is dominated by a small number of domestic 
institutions controlled by the federal government or quasi-governmental entities.  The 
government has a majority stake in the three largest domestic banks, and there are 
important restrictions on the operations of foreign banks that do not apply to domestic 
banks.  The financial sector is underpinned by close relationships between large 
corporations, banks and government – there is a strong commitment by multiple 
stakeholders to the survival and growth of corporations.  Accounting principles are 
opaque, and a lack of accountability creates opportunities for the asymmetries 
described above and moral hazard.  This situation is exacerbated by cultural 
differences; the ethos in Malaysia is “collective” rather than “individualistic” (Hofstede 
1980).   In such an environment, there is less emphasis on objective rationality and 
more reliance on factors such as the character and contacts of borrowers.  These 
factors have resulted in some ill-advised investments within bank portfolios. 
 
The focus on large corporations has led to the imposition of lending guidelines 
requiring that banks assist Bumiputeras and smaller enterprises.  These guidelines 
apply to all banks, foreign and domestic alike (OECD 1999a).  There is no doubt that 
an interventionist approach has played a critical role in promoting the growth of 
Bumiputera entrepreneurs and smaller enterprises, yet these interventions have 
distorted the financial markets.  The empirical research suggests that some credit 
rationing was taking place before the onset of the recession in 1998.  The onset of 
the recession led to a marked deterioration in private-sector funding opportunities 
available to small firms.   
 
The short-term moves by the authorities in Malaysia to clean up the bank portfolios 
and generate more lending capacity were timely and necessary.  The recent drive to 
rationalize the banking industry is perhaps more questionable.  Over the longer term, 
a market-led adjustment and deregulation (and an injection of foreign expertise) 
might bring greater benefits (OECD 1999b).  For example, credit appraisal 
techniques would improve and risk could be priced accordingly.   
 
Turning to the sources/patterns of external finance and the difficulties experienced in 
raising external finance, there were no statistically significant differences between the 
UK and Malaysia.   
 However, there was some evidence that government-sponsored institutions were 
displacing private sector finance in Malaysia.  This would reinforce the argument that 
deregulation is the way forward, leaving the Government to concentrate its efforts on 
providing truly additional finance.  Another interesting finding was the reliance in 
Malaysia on short-term bank loans.  Access to longer-term funds gives a greater 
degree of certainty and permits longer-term financial planning. 
 
With regard to the difficulties experienced in raising funds, it is impossible to draw 
any firm conclusions.  The main complaints relate to the availability of sufficient 
finance (usually linked to a lack of collateral) and high interest rates, leading to a 
failure to obtain the required funding, or perhaps being offered insufficient finance at 
higher than anticipated interest rates.  Potential high-growth firms probably have to 
contend with suboptimal financing structures and there is heavy reliance on short-
term debt finance.  
 
Entrepreneurs in both countries have to be persuaded of the benefits of equity 
finance - a programme of education is required.  (The prevalence of business plans 
in Malaysia does not seem to have led to more sophisticated financial planning.)  On 
the supply side, it is significant the UK authorities have chosen to switch some of the 
funding allocated to the Loan Guarantee Scheme to venture funds aimed at high 
technology companies.  The positive externalities stemming from high tech 
companies need to be captured for the benefit of the wider economy.  Bankers and 
venture capitalists have to be convinced of the value of high-risk investments with an 
uncertain payback.  The hope in the UK is that public-sector intervention will 
demonstrate that commercial returns are available, and hence increase the supply of 
risk capital.  However, the Malaysian experience illustrates some of the issues 
associated with targeting small firms for public sector support.   
Notes 
 
1. In the UK, the latest Department of Trade and Industry definition of a small 
firm refers to an enterprise having fewer than 50 employees.  Small-scale 
industries in Malaysia are defined as manufacturing establishments 
employing between 5 and 50 full-time workers.   
 
2. The term Bumiputera means “son of the soil”.  Although usually used in 
reference to the Malays, the term also encompasses other indigenous 
communities in the country. 
 
3. RM = Malaysian Ringgit.  Over the period of this study, the rate of exchange 
was approximately RM4 = £1. 
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